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BOOK REVIEW
FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY
By Catharine A. MacKinnon.I Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. 315. $25.00.
2
Reviewed by Cass R. Sunstein
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED.

I. INTRODUCTION

Occasionally an intellectual or political movement disrupts existing
categories, throws into question practices and conceptual structures
that had previously been accepted or even invisible, and eventually
produces substantial changes in legal rules. How and why this happens is quite mysterious. The abolitionist movement of the 1850's is
one example. Another is the New Deal, which grew out of an understanding that the common law was neither natural nor prepolitical
and failed to provide a neutral baseline for decision. 3 The most
prominent recent illustration is the civil rights movement of the 1950's
and i96o's, which challenged practices of racial exclusion. Thus the
Supreme Court rejected Plessy v. Ferguson4 on the ground that an
understanding of the purposes and effects of school segregation revealed that racial separation was hardly neutral. In all of these
contexts, practices that had for a long period been taken as natural
and inviolate, sometimes even as based on biological differences, were
revealed as socially created and subject to criticism and change.
The women's movement is the most powerful contemporary development of this sort; feminism provides its theoretical foundation.
Despite its longevity5 and its recent impact on the law, the feminist
movement has hardly run its course. Nonetheless, the basic claims
of feminist theory are in many circles denied credibility and respect,
or even a fair hearing. Ironically, those circles include many observers
IVisiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law
School.
2 Professor of Law, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
The author would like to thank Mary Becker, Veronica Dougherty, Richard Fallon, Mary Ann
Glendon, Sara Ketchum, Larry Kramer, Michael McConnell, Frank Michelman, Geoffrey
Miller, Martha Minow, Richard A. Posner, Geoffrey Stone, David A. Strauss, Kathleen Sullivan,
and Diane Wood for valuable comments on a previous draft.
3 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984);

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

6-8 (2d ed.

1988);

Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
4 x63 U.S. 537 (1896).
5 "The first unmistakably feminist voices were heard in England in the 17th century." A.
JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 3 (1983).
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strongly committed to perceptions associated with the New Deal and
the civil rights movement.
Feminist legal theory has had three principal strands, which for
convenience may be called the "difference," "different voice," and
"dominance" approaches. 6 The least controversial, associated with the
movement for the Equal Rights Amendment, is the "difference" approach, which argues that women should be permitted to compete on
equal terms with men in the public world. In this view, characteristics
legally and socially attributed to women - passivity, weakness, irrationality - are inaccurate or overbroad generalizations and at most
the product of anachronistic social practices. Thus, feminists attack
distinctions on the basis of gender - for example, laws excluding
women from "male" jobs - as reflecting prejudice rather than reality
and as perpetuating women's second-class citizenship. 7 This strand
of feminism, sometimes represented by the National Organization for
Women, has achieved widespread acceptance in legal doctrine. 8 A
more controversial aspect of the same strand is the claim that, just as
women should participate on equal terms with men in the professional
world, so too should men participate on equal terms with women in
the domestic sphere. A basic point here is that the domestic sphere
has been devalued and used as a major arena for the subordination
of women. The difference approach, if accepted, would produce significant changes in the employment market and in the care of children.
The "different voice" strand of feminist theory, associated most
visibly with the work of Carol Gilligan, 9 asserts that there is a distinctly female way of approaching moral and legal dilemmas and that
that way has been ignored or downplayed in legal doctrine and scholarship.' 0 In this view, women tend to value relationships and con6 Other strands exist outside of law. See, e.g., M. DALY, PURE LUST: ELEMENTAL FEMINIST
PHILOSOPHY (1984); M. DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1978);

A.

JAGGAR,

supra note 5.

7 See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Friedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A

ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 8o YALE L.J. 871, 888-91 (1971) (arguing for
an equal rights amendment to eliminate most classifications on the basis of sex). Some of the
most important work here was done, in and out of the courts, by then Prof. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978).
8 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (I977) (social security benefits); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (military dependance allowances).
9 See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
10 See, e.g., Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 48o-508 (discussing the
possible consequence of reconstructing constitutional law to include women's distinctive moral-

ity); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) (applying a feminist conception of dispute resolution and
transaction planning to negotiation); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986) (arguing that the feminist jurisprudence abandons prescribed

legalistic terms); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) (arguing that the feminine jurisprudence that relies on a vision closely
aligned with classical republicanism is unlike any other contemporary jurisprudence).
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whereas men tend to place a higher

premium on abstraction, rights, autonomy, separation, formality, and
neutrality - an "ethic of justice."" A centerpiece of this position is
that prevailing theories of moral development and morality in general
have taken a partial perspective and supposed it to be universal,
ignoring alternative perspectives or treating them as primitive. 12 The
"different voice" approach assumes both descriptive and normative
form, often contending that the legal system unduly emphasizes rules
and abstraction and attends insufficiently to context and reciprocal
responsibility. 13 Sometimes this approach draws on psychoanalytic
theory.14 The approach has significant consequences for a wide range
of legal rules and practices, as well as for legal and 5social theory,
both inside and outside the area of sex discrimination. 1
A third strand of feminist theory - the "dominance" approach
describes gender inequality not in terms of arbitrary or irrational
differentiation but in terms of the social subordination of women.
The problem is not that those similarly situated have been treated
differently; it is instead that one group has dominated the other, in
part through sexual practices. A wide range of issues that are not
normally thought to involve sex discrimination - including sexual
harassment, prostitution, reproductive freedom, rape, and pornography - thus raise questions of inequality. More broadly, these feminists see inequality in patterns of interaction between men and women
that are normally taken as unobjectionable and even as intrinsic to
traditional gender roles. Rape and prostitution are, in this view, not
isolated deviations from social norms; they are extreme examples of
the subordination of women that occurs in many places.1 6 The dominance approach joins the different voice approach's critique of partial
perspective, but whereas the different voice approach embraces womI

Gilligan does not attribute these characteristics to any particular biological or social source.

See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9. Okin attempts to dissolve the distinction between an ethic of
care and an ethic of justice by incorporating empathy into Rawls' theory of justice. See Okin,
Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 ETHICS - (forthcoming Jan. 1989).
12 See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9.
13 See Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword:Justice Engendered, xox HARV.
L. REv. io (1987).
14 See, e.g., N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); D. DINNERSTEIN,
THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976).

Is See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note io;Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, ioo HARV. L. REv. 4, 17 n.68 (1986); Minow, When
Difference Has its Honze: Group Hones for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal
Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. X1I (1987); Simon, The Invention and
Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. I (1985).
16Examples can be found throughout popular culture. Consider, for example, the familiar
forcible taking of women in movies and television; the scenario in which a woman initially
resists aggressive overtures and then relents; the plot in which a woman falls in love with her
rapist.
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en's need for relationship and connectedness, the dominance approach
claims that women need to be freed from practices that subordinate
and invade them. The dominance view is thus sometimes skeptical
of the different voice approach, claiming that women's capacity for
empathy and need for relationship is in part the product of the social
subordination of women.
Catharine MacKinnon is the most prominent and persistent advocate for the dominance strand of feminist theory. She is also the
most important force behind the claim that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination. 17 That notion, for which MacKinnon is
given too little credit, seemed bizarre and radical to many when
initially put forward. Remarkably, MacKinnon's basic position was
accepted in 1986 by every member of the Supreme Court - with a
majority opinion written by then Justice Rehnquist.18 This development must count as one of the more dramatic and rapid changes in
legal and social understanding in recent years. In addition, MacKinnon has supplied much of the underpinning for the current rethinking of both rape and prostitution; her criticisms focus on the systemic
effects of these practices, their parallels in more conventional forms
of gender relations, and the partial perspectives found in the legal
treatment of both. 19 MacKinnon has been perhaps the most important
force behind the burgeoning theoretical literature in law on sex discrimination and feminist theory. 20 With Andrea Dworkin, MacKinnon has developed what is probably her most controversial thesis:
the idea that pornography is a form of sex discrimination. 21 In these
and other areas, MacKinnon's work has generated a dramatic shift in
legal thinking and reoriented the terms of debate.
In all of these settings, MacKinnon's basic position is that the
social and legal treatment of gender should be challenged today just
as common law categories and racial exclusion were challenged during
the New Deal period and the 195o's, respectively. MacKinnon claims
that gender relations, like the common law and racial practices, are

17 See C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
18 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (I986). Justice Marshall wrote a con-

currence joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote a
separate concurrence.
19 See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 635, 643-55 (1983); MacKinnon, Feminism,

Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE &
Soc'Y 515, 529-42 (1982); see also S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
20 See sources cited supra note i4; Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the

Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Scales, supra note io,
at 1374-75.
21 See infra pp. 840-42; see also A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
(x981).
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regarded as natural or prepolitical but are actually socially constructed, alterable, and unjust. Although few recent writers in law
have been so creative or influential, there are important arenas in
which her work is ignored and even ridiculed.
Feminism Unmodified is a collection of MacKinnon's speeches on
sex discrimination over a six-year period, some of which have been
published previously. The book is divided into three parts. The first
is theoretical and general, setting out MacKinnon's distinctive approach to sex discrimination. The second, called "Applications," deals
with rape, abortion, sexual harassment, and athletics. The third part
of the book consists of six essays on pornography.
Each of the essays published in Feminism Unmodified stands on
its own, making the book a collection of separate entries rather than
one sustained argument. Because each essay was originally a speech,
the discussions are lucid and dramatic, with the dynamism, immediacy, and sense of discovery of a live presentation; they are also filled
with irony, wit, and humor. On the other hand, the book has considerable repetition and overlap. The arguments are less tight, analytic, and systematic than they might be; some of MacKinnon's other
work is more careful and sustained. 2 2 MacKinnon anticipates counterarguments only occasionally, and careful elaboration of implications
is not one of the book's strengths; the discussion is sometimes too
polemical. Nevertheless, the book contains brilliant insights, genuine
creativity, and rare originality. It should have a significant impact on
thinking about sex discrimination and on social and legal thought
more generally.

HI.

SEX DISCRIMINATION: DIFFERENCES AND DOMINANCE

MacKinnon's general treatment of sex discrimination, first set out
in Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 23 derives from her description and critique of the difference approach, which she claims is the
most prominent in current law. The difference approach holds that
the purpose of constitutional and statutory proscriptions is to ensure
that laws reflect both real similarities and real differences and thus
"track reality."
The difference approach endorses two paths to equality. The first
is rooted in strict gender neutrality and insists that women are and
should be treated "the same as men" (p. 33). Distinctions on the basis
of gender, especially those that deny women opportunities available
to men, are presumptively unlawful. Much of modern law under the
22 See C. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State (unpublished manuscript,
May 1987); sources cited supra note ig.
23 C. MACKINNON, supra note 17.
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equal protection clause and title VII reflects this understanding. 24 The
central premise is freedom of choice, often expressed in terms of
equality of opportunity: people should be permitted to choose jobs
and social roles in ways unaffected by irrelevant characteristics like
gender.
The second path to equality under the difference approach qualifies
this basic theme of sameness, recognizing that in some respects women
are not similarly situated to men. This path is designed for "women
who want equality yet find that [they] are different" (p. 33) and
culminates in "the special benefit rule," which authorizes the state to
recognize "real differences" between men and women. Thus, for example, courts will uphold laws or practices that recognize the distinctive physical characteristics of women. Sometimes such laws impose
burdens on women, as in reproduction-related restrictions of employment opportunities; sometimes they create "special benefits," as in
leave policies for pregnant women.
MacKinnon is not entirely hostile to the difference approach; she
acknowledges that it has accomplished considerable good. In her
view, however, it is inadequate for two reasons. First, the difference
approach - precisely because it is based on a norm of formal equality
or sex-blindness - does nothing about many existing structural inequalities between men and women. Those inequalities in wealth and
power are taken for granted; they are treated as the inevitable background conditions against which legal disputes must be resolved. "A
gender-neutral approach ...

obscures ...

the fact that women's

poverty, financial dependency, motherhood, and sexual accessibility
...

substantively make up women's status as women" (p. 73) (em-

phasis in original). For a variety of reasons, women are not in fact
situated similarly to men, and legal rules pretending that they are will
sometimes reduce rather than increase the likelihood of obtaining
equality. For example, the recent transformation of the law of custody
and divorce, embodying a norm of formal equality, has harmed
women and helped men. 25 Under the difference approach, "society
advantages [men] before they get into court, and law is prohibited
from taking that preference into account because that would mean
taking gender into account" (p. 35).

24 See supra note 8; see also D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE (i986)
[hereinafter GENDER JUSTICE] (arguing for equal liberty as the benchmark in governmental
treatment of gender).
25 See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. ii8i (ig81); see also M. GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 86 n.67 (1987) (noting that post-divorce economic
burdens fall disproportionately on women). See generally Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract
Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. - (forthcoming x988) (criticizing formal equality as a constitutional standard).
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The difference approach is also inadequate because it uses men as
the baseline from which to measure difference. According to MacKinnon, legal rules that use men as the referent, and allow differential
treatment of women when it is based on real differences from men,
do not enshrine any obvious conception of gender equality. Instead,
they amount to a false universalization that depends on a particular
standpoint - men's biology and career patterns - from which to
assess "difference." Consider the legal treatment of women's distinctive reproductive capacities: to understand rules that accommodate
those capacities as a "special benefit" is to apply a male baseline.
"Men's physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and
health insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define
workplace expectations and successful career patterns ....
For each
of their differences from women, what amounts to an affirmative
action plan is in effect" (p. 36). The use of male practices as the norm
thus produces an inadequate law of sex discrimination; for MacKinnon, the problem is not one of abstract differences at all.
Of recent cases addressing states' attempts to provide pregnancy
leave and related job security,2 6 MacKinnon remarks, "Difference
doctrine says it is sex discrimination to give women what we need,
because only women need it. It is not sex discrimination not to give
women what we need because then only women will not get what we
need" (p. 36). Under the difference approach, the legal system does
nothing about preexisting legal and social disabilities brought about
by past discrimination and women's reproductive roles. Examples
include public or private rules that forbid employees from being the
primary caretaker of a preschool child, rules that prohibit fertile
women from taking certain jobs, 27 and the concentration of women
in low-paying jobs. 28 None of these practices is unlawful under the
difference approach. The claim of inequality underlying Feminism
Unmodified is not the relatively narrow argument that women have
been treated "unequally to men"; it is instead that there is a system
of sexual subordination of women that should be altered. For
MacKinnon, the notion that the similarly situated must be treated
similarly is an inadequate way to approach issues of sex discrimination.
Under MacKinnon's alternative - the dominance approach - the
goal of sex discrimination law "is not to make legal categories trace

26 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974). But see California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987)
(adopting a perspective similar to MacKinnon's).
27 See Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHi. L. REV.
I219 (1986).
28 See Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1728 (1986).
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and trap the way things are. It is not to make rules that fit reality.
It is critical of reality" (p. 40).29 The problem is not whether and
how much difference there is between men and women; it is instead
how the legal system should respond to these differences. "The difference approach tries to map reality; the dominance approach tries
to challenge and change it" (p. 44). "[S]ex inequality questions are
questions of systematic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not
at all abstract and is anything but a mistake" (p. 42).
MacKinnon is impatient with biological explanations of gender
inequality. The question is not whether such differences exist, but
what society does with them - in short, their legal and social consequences. For the situations relevant here, it is the legal system that
decides when and how biological differences are relevant, turning
differences, which might be treated as immaterial, into legal disadvantages. 30 The dominance approach thus reads difference as "inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory artifact, its outcome presented as its origin" (p. 8).
In some circumstances, the dominance approach might yield results
that are identical to current law - for example, by invalidating
statutes that make employment of a particular sort more attractive
for men than for women. 3 1 Some laws would be upheld under both
approaches but with divergent rationales. A law establishing different
ages for statutory rape of men and women might be upheld not on
the biological ground invoked by the Supreme Court in the Michael
M. case 3 2 but on the theory that rape of young girls by men is far
more common than rape of young boys by women. Gender-specific
statutory rape laws are thus sensible safeguards rather than underinclusive reflections of prejudice.
At the same time, the dominance approach would challenge many
legal practices that current law takes for granted. It would, for
example, treat as issues of sex discrimination questions that are not
so regarded by current law, including reproductive rights and abortion, battery of women, rape, prostitution, sexual assault of girls, the
disproportionate presence of women in low-paying occupations, and
female poverty. In all of these areas, the dominance approach would
not treat current practices as the inevitable background conditions
against which questions of sexual equality must be measured; it would
instead require changes in those practices in order to bring about
equality.
29 Here the analogy to the New Deal critique of the common law is particularly clear. See
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, IOI HARv. L. REV. 421 (1987); Sunstein, supra
note 3.
3oSee C. MAcKINNON, supra note 17.
31See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating a Social Security Act
provision that made survivors' benefits payable to widows but not to widowers).
32 Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (ig8i).
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MacKinnon's critique addresses the same problem that underlay
the controversy over Lochner v. New York: 33 legal formality that
assumes a particular and unarticulated baseline. Assumptions about
baselines produce understandings of what is natural or constructed,
neutral or partisan, and action or inaction. MacKinnon is in a long
tradition of critics of social practices premised on status quo baselines,
and her discussion here has implications not only for sex discrimination but also for legal and social theory more generally.
MacKinnon's attack on unarticulated baselines challenges some
familiar analytic strategies in law. Her discussion of legal abstraction,
formality, principle, and neutrality suggests that these terms often
conceal a contested substantive understanding that denies its status as
such. 34 MacKinnon argues that the idea that justice is neutrality
between abstract categories ignores social distinctions between those
categories, as the Court did in Plessy v. Ferguson35 (pp. 165-66). In
MatKinnon's view, similar understandings are at work in current law,
including the attack on affirmative action: "[i]n the view that equates
differentiation with discrimination, changing an unequal status quo is
discrimination, but allowing it to exist is not" (p. 42). Indeed, the
very term "affirmative action" suggests that use of the market represents inaction and that efforts to compensate for the existing distribution of benefits and burdens between blacks and whites or women
and men should be regarded as "affirmative." MacKinnon's claim also
challenges one understanding of "neutral principles" '3 6 - an understanding that was initially deployed to question the Court's reasoning
in Brown v. Board of Education3 7 on the grounds that the case did
not involve discrimination at all and that the Court had failed to show
why the associational preferences of blacks should be favored over
38
those of whites.
Although aspects of the general approach to sex discrimination in
Feminism Unmodified were first set out in Sexual Harassment of
Working Women, the emphasis has changed. Feminism Unmodified
attributes gender inequality above all to sexuality and sexual practices:
"I think the fatal error of the legal arm of feminism has been its failure
to understand that the mainspring of sex inequality is misogyny and
33 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

34 Consider, for example, the "state action" doctrine in current constitutional law, which is
not in fact a search for state action, but instead depends on background understandings about
what government ordinarily or naturally does. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 886-88.
35 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I
(1959).
3' 347 U.S. 483 (i954).

38 See Wechsler, supra note 36, at 33-34; cf. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup.
CT. REV. 99 (arguing that affirmative action is logically continuous with the prohibition of
discrimination as established in Brown v. Board of Education).
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the mainspring of misogyny is sexual sadism" (p. 5). MacKinnon takes
the sexual objectification of women, and current sexuality in general,
as a central cause of sexual subordination - an issue I take up below.
It is for this reason that pornography, rather than, for example,
occupational segregation or childcare responsibility, is MacKinnon's
central target. And it is no doubt in part this aspect of MacKinnon's
critique that has made her views so controversial. Her claims threaten
areas thought to be personal and private, attack the neo-Freudian
orthodoxy that urges the liberation of sexual drives from repression,
and pointedly part company with certain aspects of mainstream lib39
eralism.
To summarize, MacKinnon's basic criticism is an attack on the
understanding of sex discrimination as a problem of irrational differentiation. In her view, sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Pornography is a participant in the construction and perpetuation of sexual hierarchy. Roe v. Wade40 turns out to be a case
involving sex discrimination. 4 1 MacKinnon's argument cuts deeper
still: state action limits, at least as conventionally conceived, become
subject to challenge. The private sphere, in which widespread sex
discrimination takes place, is hardly prepolitical and sacrosanct, as
recent developments in family law have demonstrated. 42 It should be
plain that MacKinnon's approach, because it expands and recasts the
prohibition on sex discrimination, is radically different from much of
current law. Hence MacKinnon's proposed substitute for the Equal
Rights Amendment is a women's rights amendment providing: "the
subordination of women to men is hereby abolished" (p. 28).
A. The Problem of Ends
Challenges to MacKinnon's approach come from several directions.
The first challenge involves MacKinnon's ends. Many women today
do not perceive the world in MacKinnon's terms; indeed, not a few
are hostile to her depiction, and many do not seek the sorts of changes
proposed in Feminism Unmodified. For these women, the problem
39 In Feminism Unmodified, MacKinnon identifies liberalism with conceptions of politics
that see threats as coming exclusively from the public sphere or that take the existing set of
preferences and the existing distribution of power as exogenous and natural. These ideas
represent, however, a quite narrow aspect of the liberal tradition. See S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN
CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1984). It is a mistake to reject the

liberal tradition entirely simply because it has been distorted by some of its purported opponents.
MacKinnon's remarks about "liberalism" are too casual in this regard.
40 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41 See infra pp. 839-40; see also Ginsburg, Some Thought on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REv. 375, 382-83 (1985) (discussing Roe as a sex discrimination case).
42 See sources cited supra note 25.
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of sex discrimination has neither the nature nor the magnitude that
MacKinnon suggests, and the world she describes - one of widespread and objectionable gender hierarchy - is not the world in which
they live. The forms of discrimination MacKinnon challenges are, in
this view, largely a product of free choice or biology; other, more
invidious inequalities are already addressed or can be remedied by
contemporary law. For such skeptics, the difference approach, the
overriding goal of which is to free people to seek their own disparate
goals, is preferable. 4 3 Many women who find traditional roles satisfying and rewarding would find it intrusive and counterproductive for
government to try to bring about MacKinnon's version of substantive
equality.

44

This critique of MacKinnon replicates earlier invocations of freedom of choice that have been roundly repudiated in modern law,
including the attack on the New Deal (especially minimum wage and
maximum hour legislation), 4 5 and the critique of modern civil rights
legislation. 46 Such critiques ignore both problems of collective action
and the ways in which apparently free choices are the product of the
existing legal regime. Collective action problems make it extremely
difficult for a dispersed and diffuse group to organize and seek reform.
In the context of sex discrimination, moreover, the phenomenon of
47
adaptive preferences - emphasized in recent rational choice theory
- is especially important, for it undermines conventional understandings of free choice. 48 Private preferences are not always autonomous;
they are in part a product of existing social practice, including social
pressures and the absence of opportunities. 4 9 If opportunities are
unavailable, people often try to reduce cognitive dissonance 50 by scal43See GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 12.
44See id. at 13-28.
45For a recent example, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 274-82 (1985).
46 See Bork, Civil Rights - A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21.
47See J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 109-40 (1983); J. Roemer, Optimal Endogenous Preferences
(1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); MacPherson, Want Formation, Morality,
and Some 'Interpretive'Aspects of Economic Inquiry, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AS MORAL INQUIRY
96 (N. Haan, R. Bellah, P. Rabinow & W. Sullivan eds. 1983). The term "adaptive preferences"
is preferable to "false consciousness," because the latter has a tendency to tautology and lacks
cognitive foundations.
48 Serious collective action problems also arise here; the individual costs of organization may
be quite high in comparison to the individual benefits, but the aggregate benefits may outweigh
the aggregate costs.
49 Sometimes the phenomenon of adaptive preferences is treated as a preference change
through learning. In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between adaptive preferences and
preferences modified by greater information; for present purposes, we may treat them as equivalent.
50 See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1958) (describing
cognitive dissonance and attempts to reduce it).
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ing back their aspirations. More generally, the phenomenon of adaptive preferences makes it difficult to contend that legal rules should
always or necessarily be based on current preferences. 5 ' If preferences
are a function of legal rules and social practices, those rules and
practices cannot be defended by reference to the preferences without

circularity. 5 2
This basic point has especially powerful implications in the area
of sexual inequality.5 3 Women's preferences have been formed against
a background of limited opportunities. In these circumstances, the

fact that many women are or seem content with the status quo is not
a dispositive argument against social change. A system of formal
equality leaves in place preferences and opportunities that are products
of past discrimination. 54 It is a significant advantage of MacKinnon's
approach that, unlike many purportedly feminist critiques, it does not
evade the "freedom of choice" question but challenges it head on.
Although MacKinnon's argument responds persuasively to a familiar argument in favor of the difference approach, it does not supply
a complete affirmative case for the dominance approach. That approach is difficult to evaluate in the abstract, and it is not fully
elaborated in Feminism Unmodified. Moreover, the notion of "dominance" is somewhat ambiguous and itself depends on some sort of
baseline. Any judgment about the dominance approach calls for an
evaluation of both the context and the practical impact of that approach on the lives of women and men.5s Such an evaluation will
also depend on the prospects for change in light of the fact that
preferences and practices are already in place and may be difficult to
alter. Indeed, sometimes efforts at alteration are counterproductive,
and Feminism Unmodified does not examine the problem of transition.
S Consider Montesquieu's discussion of adaptive preferences on the part of women in the
harem, Montesquieu, Letter XXVI: Usbek to Roxana, at the Seraglio at Ispahan, in i THE
PERSIAN AND CHINESE LETTERS 6I (J.

Davidson trans. 1892) (1721), and the ambivalent

reactions of the newly freed slaves as discussed in L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG
(1979).
52 See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
Of course, it is important to be careful and precise with rationales of this sort, for there are
risks of tyranny in approaches that tend to disregard private preferences.
53 Analogues exist in the racial area, see L. LITwAcK, supra note 51, and in the judicial
reception of so-called "freedom of choice" plans in school desegregation, discussed in Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
728 (x986).
54 The Supreme Court has recognized this point in the context of school segregation. See
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968); see also Gewirtz, supra note 53, at
748-54.
55 Of course, difficult epistemological questions lurk here on the issue of cultural criticism.
See P. RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1986); M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION
AND SOCIAL CRITICISM ch. 2 (1987).
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It is an advantage of MacKinnon's argument, however, that she tends
to be highly contextual in her discussion, particularly in the areas of
reproductive freedom, sexual harassment, and pornography.
MacKinnon proposes that statutes restricting reproductive rights
be treated as forms of sex discrimination. Such laws are discriminatory, both in purpose and effect, because they are a product of traditional understandings of the role of women in bearing and raising
children. Seen in this light, laws prohibiting public funding of abortions should be understood as grounded in the same discrimination
56
that motivates laws forbidding abortion altogether.
Sexual harassment and pornography present somewhat different
problems, but their cultural context and practical effects also raise
issues of discrimination. It is fanciful to deny that women are the
principal victims of sexual harassment or that they are the principal
objects of abuse in and as a result of pornography. Comparable worth
raises still different issues. 5 7 By increasing salaries in traditional female jobs, comparable worth remedies might reinforce women's preferences for those jobs or distort the employment market. These possibilities argue against such remedial proposals, even if countervailing
factors make them justifiable. Practical considerations of this sort
suggest that substantial work will be necessary to apply the dominance
approach in particular contexts. Whatever the precise meaning of the
approach, however, it is clear that its application would move the
law further in the direction of gender equality.
B. The Problem of Means
Another challenge to MacKinnon's approach emphasizes the problem of means. MacKinnon does not specify which institutions would
provide the locus for the changes she advocates. It is difficult to
expect courts to undertake the relevant tasks; there is no real parallel
in public or private law for the sorts of departures MacKinnon seeks.
Even in the area of racial discrimination, the judiciary has played a
relatively narrow role. The lack of an available institution for implementing MacKinnon's proposals thus might argue against the dominance approach.
The institutional objections, however, are hardly insurmountable.
Even if courts are inapt initiators, they might assist in achieving the
measures sought by MacKinnon - for example, by recognizing sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, upholding at least some
forms of antipornography regulation, or requiring the legislature to
fund abortions if it funds the expenses of bringing a child to term.
Consider also the possibility of constitutional or statutory attacks on
s6 See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1345-47.
s7 See Weiler, supra note 28.
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criminal enforcement policies that permit differential risks of violence
to be faced by men and women, both in and out of the home. Most
measures directed toward what is currently conceived of as the private
sphere would require executive or legislative action. In still other
areas, coercive action in the form of legal requirements might be
counterproductive or otherwise undesirable, 58 in which case private
efforts would be preferable.
It is important to recognize that the dominance approach is not
self-applying. In some settings, it is not clear whether a law subordinates women - or, more importantly, whether a change in the law
would reduce social subordination or reinforce it. These considerations suggest that MacKinnon's approach needs to be deepened and
supplemented. But her basic critique of the law of sex discrimination
is quite powerful in its exposure of issues that have traditionally been
understood in gender-neutral terms. It points in the right directions.
IlI. APPLICATIONS OF THE DOMINANCE APPROACH:
ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY, AND OTHER PROBLEMS
A large portion of Feminism Unmodified is devoted to the exploration of particular topics. MacKinnon points out that the extent and
nature of rape and sexual harassment are relatively recent discoveries
(P. 5); the same is true of pornography. These topics were hardly on
the legal agenda just a decade ago. Courts and commentators have
begun to rethink all of them, and MacKinnon, who helped initiate
that process, offers a number of useful observations in Feminism
Unmodified.
In a provocative essay on abortion, MacKinnon applies her general
critique of the notion of a prepolitical and noncoercive private sphere
of gender relations into which government must not enter. She argues
that the Court's decision to approach Roe v. Wade5 9 as a case involving privacy rather than equality was a mistake, based on a disregard
for the sex-based character of reproduction and the tacit assumption
that women have equal control over sex. In MacKinnon's view,
"[s]exual intercourse, still the most common cause of pregnancy, cannot simply be presumed coequally determined" (p. 94-95). Women
often fail to use contraception because to do so "means acknowledging
and planning the possibility of intercourse, accepting one's sexual
availability, and appearing nonspontaneous" (p. 95). In light of these
overlooked facts, MacKinnon argues that Roe was myopic in treating
58 This is the view of some in the area of pornography. See American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. I985), aff'd men., 475 U.S. iooi (1986); Stone, Anti-Pornography

Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986). For a discussion of this view, see pages 842-46 below.
S9 410 U.S. 113 (1073).
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the issue as one involving privacy. That formulation suggests that
the decision was partly responsive to "the interests of men as a group"
(P. 97) in making women sexually available to men. 60 MacKinnon
argues that "under conditions of gender inequality, sexual liberation
[as promoted by the Roe reasoning] does not free women; it frees male
sexual aggression" (p. 99).
MacKinnon speculates about why the legal system has structured
the abortion issue in terms of privacy: "if inequality is socially pervasive and enforced, equality will require intervention, not abdication,
to be meaningful. But the right to privacy is not thought to require
social change. It is not even thought to require any social preconditions, other than nonintervention by the public" (p. ioo). If the Court
had structured the issue in terms of gender inequality and resolved it
under the dominance approach, the issue of federal funding 61 might
have come out differently. "[F]ramed as a privacy right, a woman's
decision to abort would have no claim on public support" (p. ioi);
but as a right to equality, such a claim would be much harder to
deny.
MacKinnon's principal application of the dominance approach is
in the area of pornography - defined not as sexually explicit materials
but as those that associate sex with violence. 62 There is some repetition in the six relevant chapters, but the reader is given a good sense
of the development of MacKinnon's thought. The early essays are
tentative. The middle ones have a sense of discovery, developing
MacKinnon's now well-known approach to the subject. The later
essays deal harshly with the objections of some women to the antipornography campaign and with the judicial treatment of the sub63
ject.
MacKinnon's discussion of pornography is likely to be the most
controversial part of Feminism Unmodified. It is important to understand the treatment within the context of her broader argument
60 See A. DWORKIN, RIGHT WING WOMEN 95 (i983) ("Getting laid was at stake."), quoted

in

FEMINISM UNMODIFIED at 99.
61 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (i98o); see also Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 383-86

(criticizing the Supreme Court's abortion funding decisions).
62 See American Booksellers, 771 F.2d 323; Indianapolis Code § 16-3(q).
63 Of female opponents of pornography, MacKinnon writes:
Women who defend the pornographers are defending a source of their relatively high
position among women under male supremacy, keeping all women, including them, an
inferior class on the basis of sex, enforced by sexual force ....
I want you to stop
claiming that your liberalism, with its elitism, and your Freudianism, with its sexualized
misogyny, has anything in common with feminism (p. 205).
Of the judiciary, she argues:
The Supreme Court just told us that it is a constitutional right to traffic in our flesh, so
long as it is done through pictures and words, and a legislature may not give us access
to court to contest it ....
The struggle against pornography is an abolitionist struggle
to establish that just as buying and selling human beings never was anyone's property
right, buying and selling women and children is no one's civil liberty (p. 213).
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about sex discrimination and her general strategy for reform. A focus
on the antipornography movement isolated from these broader themes
will miss the basic point, regardless of one's ultimate conclusion about
the issue of government control of pornography.
"What you are hearing tonight," MacKinnon asserts, "is something
that has not been said before" (p. 127). She believes that feminist
claims about the meaning and effects of pornography have been obscured by the sexual revolution of the 196o's and by the power of
Freudian and associated antirepression theories of sexuality in intellectual and popular circles. MacKinnon's argument differs sharply
from other, far less persuasive arguments for the regulation of sexually
64
explicit speech.
MacKinnon makes three basic claims. First, she suggests that
severe harms are done to women in the production of pornography
and that regulation of the resulting material is necessary to prevent
those harms. Second, MacKinnon contends that pornography has a
causal connection to acts of sexual violence against women. Third,
and most generally, MacKinnon claims that pornography influences
the attitudes of both men and women in gender relations, attitudes
that help produce unlawful discrimination and foster gender inequality. Her basic argument is that the creation of a cause of action on
behalf of women harmed by pornography would reduce the amount
of pornography, give relief to those directly harmed by it, and at the
same time affect male and female attitudes toward it.
In MacKinnon's view,
Pornography sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution,
and child sexual abuse; it thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes,
and legitimates them. More generally, it eroticizes the dominance and
submission that is the dynamic common to them all. It makes hierarchy sexy and calls that "the truth about sex" or just a mirror of
reality (p. 17i) (citations omitted).
MacKinnon claims that "pornography is neither harmless fantasy nor
a corrupt and confused misrepresentation of an otherwise natural and
healthy sexual situation. It institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing the eroticization of dominance and submission with
the social construction of male and female" (p. 172). MacKinnon
continues: "What in the pornographic view is love and romance looks
a great deal like hatred and torture to the feminist" (p. 174). The law
64 The argument has also been made by other feminists, including Andrea Dworkin, with
whom MacKinnon has worked closely. See, e.g., A. DWORXIN, supra note 21. Similar arguments have been accepted in West Germany since the early 197o's, and West German courts
have concluded that pornography is inconsistent with constitutionally guaranteed human dignity.
See Rieman, Pornographyand Human Dignity: A West German Perspective, MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall 1986, at 1-2.
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of obscenity 65 misconceives the problem because it is indifferent to
the issue of harm - depending instead on offensiveness - and because it is gender-neutral.
The recognition that many categories of speech are currently regulable adds power to MacKinnon's argument, as do her description
of the abuses that are sexualized in pornography, her discussion of
the harms to women in and as a result of pornography, and her highly
plausible claims of a causal connection between pornography and
violence. Having absorbed MacKinnon's point, one notices sexualized
violence against women in numerous places in modern culture, severely weakening one's initial instincts against control of at least some
speech that merges sex with violence.
This analysis produced the well-known ordinance drafted by
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, which defines pornography as discrimination based on sex - a civil rights violation. The ordinance
defines pornography in part as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words" (p. 262). The
ordinance is not aimed at sexually explicit materials in themselves.
Its principal target is sexually explicit materials that also involve
violence, either in their making or their use. Most of the provisions
are directed at the production of pornography or abusive practices in
or as a result of pornography; the most controversial provision authorizes women to sue traffickers in pornography. The ordinance
denominates this general right to relief from pornographic practices a
civil rights action.
It is important to distinguish positions with which MacKinnon's
approach is sometimes confused. MacKinnon does not argue that
pornography should be regulated because it is offensive. She does not
claim that the community has a right to censor speech that does not
conform to its moral position. Nor, on the other hand, does she draw
a sharp distinction between pornography and erotica. MacKinnon's
highly controversial claim is not that pornography is a perversion of
sexuality; it is instead that pornography helps to constitute sexuality.
MacKinnon's analysis raises two distinct questions. First, is her
description of the problem posed by pornography persuasive? Second,
is her remedy for the problem - a civil rights action - a desirable
one? One could accept her view about the social meaning of porno66
graphy but simultaneously oppose control of pornographic speech.
With respect to the first question, MacKinnon's diagnosis of pornography as a form of sex discrimination has been criticized from two
perspectives. Some. critics deny that pornography is harmful. Others

65 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. I5 (973).
66 See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mere., 475

U.S. iooi (1986); Stone, supra note 58.
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claim that feminism and pornography are compatible, that women
enjoy (at least some forms of) pornography, and that the harms of
pornography are gender-neutral. But these objections seem weak.
There is mounting evidence that sexual violence occurs both in and
as a result of pornography. Abuses within the pornography industry
appear widespread. 67 Considerable evidence from laboratory experiments and the real world also suggests a link between pornography
and sexual violence. 68 Of course, both laboratory and real world
evidence suffer from serious methodological defects - the former
because of the enormous difficulty of extrapolation, the latter because
of possible confounding variables. Even if causation were clear and
overwhelming, however, it would be hard to demonstrate, and in
other areas of law, regulation is permitted on the basis of suggestive
-

but inconclusive -

evidence. 69 It would be absurd to suggest that

most sexual violence is a result of pornography or that sexual violence
would disappear if pornography were eliminated. Moreover, some of
MacKinnon's rhetoric is overstated. The evidence with respect to the
harmful effects of pornography is, however, sufficiently powerful to
justify regulation.
It is true that some women enjoy pornography, even if it is narrowly defined to include work that merges sex with violence. It is
sometimes urged in this connection that female sexuality has only
begun to express itself openly and voluntarily and that regulation of
pornography, even when violent, would prevent the free development
and expression of women's sexuality.70 MacKinnon responds that
sexuality is to a large degree socially constructed for both men and
women. In her view, it is entirely unsurprising that some women find
cultural symbols that mesh violence with sexuality to be sexually
arousing. We have seen that preferences and beliefs are socially
formed. 7 1 In light of the harmful effects of pornography as defined
here -

with its focus on violence -

the fact that some women enjoy

it is not a reason to do nothing about it. 7 2 One need not take a
position on MacKinnon's broadest claims about the relationship between sexuality and sexual inequality in order to agree that the fact
67 See I ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 767-835

(x986).
68 See, e.g., PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds.
1984).

69 Consider, for example, the uncertainties involved in the regulation of carcinogens. See S.
BREGER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORMS 135-40 (1982).
70 See Brief Amici Curie of the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce at 27-32, American

Booksellers, 475 U.S. iooi (1986) (No. 85-1090).
71See supra pp. 836-37.
72 "[The defense of lesbian sadomasochism would sacrifice all women's ability to walk down
the street in safety for the freedom to torture a woman in the privacy of one's basement without
fear of intervention, in the name of everyone's freedom of choice" (p. 15).
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that some women associate sexuality and violence is not a sufficient
reason to permit the distribution of every film that merges sexuality
and violence.
Other critics claim that pornography cannot be a form of sex
discrimination because it harms and degrades both women and men.
This argument, reflecting fundamental resistance to MacKinnon's
basic point, is difficult to take seriously: whether or not women are
nominal victims, pornography generally treats them as the ultimate
target of sexual violence and objectification. Indeed, the persistence
of such claims reveals the strength of MacKinnon's critique, especially
insofar as she suggests that pornography renders some forms of sexual
73
inequality invisible.
All of this suggests that MacKinnon's analysis of the social meaning
of pornography is persuasive. The question of legal control, however,
is trickier. The conventional criticisms are that the problem of defining pornography is insurmountable and that the risks to freedom of
speech outweigh any gains that would come from regulation. In these
circumstances, the remedy, opponents claim, is "more speech," not
government regulation. 74 From a strategic perspective, critics argue
that other problems facing women - also emphasized in Feminism
Unmodified - are much higher priorities than government regulation
of pornography.
The problems of definition are indeed considerable - especially
in light of the fact that materials with some of the characteristics of
pornography can be found throughout modern culture. Moreover,
parts of MacKinnon's own effort at definition might be faulted for
overbreadth. 75 The problems of definition are not, however, insurmountable.
First amendment doctrine furnishes the building blocks for a quite
conventional argument for regulation of pornography. First, most of
the speech at issue is far afield from the central purposes of the first
amendment under almost any view. Distinctions among categories of
speech in terms of their centrality to first amendment purposes are
well established in constitutional law, and a system of free expression
could not sensibly ignore them. 76 For example, conspiracies, bribes,

73 "The harm of pornography, broadly speaking, is the harm of the civil inequality of the
sexes made invisible as harm because it has become accepted as the sex difference" (p. 178).
74 The roots of the "more speech" approach are found in Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
75 For example, it might be desirable to exempt at least some pornographic material having
significant social value, at least when there was no illegality in the production. See generally
Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 624-26 (arguing that
pornography is generally "low-value" speech entitled to less protection).
76 See Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. Rev. 889 (1986); Sunstein,
supra note 75. MacKinnon attacks the first amendment logic that distinguishes between harmful
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unlawful contracts, false statements of fact, private libel, misleading

commercial advertising, and child pornography are regulable, 7 7 largely
because they do not promote the purposes associated with free speech,
which involve public deliberation, broadly understood. 78 The harms
of pornography, canvassed above, are sufficient to justify regulation
under the standards applied to low-value speech. 79 Pornography,
narrowly defined, does not present a weaker claim for regulation than
many similar types of speech that are regulable under current law.
Those skeptical of MacKinnon's approach are undoubtedly concerned about the dangers of overinclusion and misapplication. These
concerns are persuasive when the underlying harms are minimal and
the risks of overinclusiveness or misapplication quite large. In the
context of pornography, however, the risks of what some might see
as "inaction" - involving harms to women in and as a result of
pornography - are considerable. Further, there is little reason to
doubt that a carefully worded statute, posing no greater threat to free
expression than the other categories of regulable speech, could be
drawn.
The final set of objections to MacKinnon's approach is largely
strategic. Opponents suggest that pornography is a relatively minor
factor in gender inequality8 ° compared to economic and other factors.
The antipornography campaign is said to create an odd alliance with
groups whose concerns conflict with feminism. And to the extent that
the merger of violence-and sexuality is a social problem, it is also
severe in mainstream advertising, television, and popular culture all of which sexualize violence, but none of which would be reached
by the ordinance written by Dworkin and MacKinnon. Seen in this

words and acts. Thus, she asks, is a "Whites Only" sign the idea or the practice of segregation?
(p. I56).
77 For an overview, see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 7 (1986).

78 This is of course a controversial view, associated with Alexander Meiklejohn. See A.
But on any
plausible view of the central function of free expression, pornography, if narrowly defined, is
likely to qualify as low-value speech.
79See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 609-17 (rejecting the claim that antipornography legislation
is viewpoint based).
80 MacKinnon responds:
Some of the social theorists in my audiences are not convinced that pornography can be
part of the subordination of women because the subordination of women happens in
places where, they say, there is no pornography.... Pornography, they say, is effect
and not cause because the oppression of women predates pornography, so anything done
about pornography will do nothing about the oppression of women. It does not matter
that racism happens in specific forms all over the world without ceasing to be racist. It
does not matter that these people think something should be done about the Ku Klux
Klan even though white racists in South Africa do not wear sheets and burn crosses....
They do not say apartheid should be ignored as effect rather than cause because white
racism precedes it and happens elsewhere in different forms (p. 222).
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
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context, the attack on the pornography industry might be thought
misdirected.81
Such an attack would, however, do some good for some women,
and - a central point - discussion and identification of the problem
is likely to contribute to efforts to address the other problems as well.
The fact that control of pornography would not bring about sexual
equality by itself is hardly a persuasive reason not to initiate a measure
that might do considerable good. In some circles, moreover, the
antipornography movement has served as a powerful spur to changed
attitudes on the part of both men and women.
MacKinnon's discussion of sexuality, however, has a deeper point,
and this point underlies some of the resistance to the antipornography
movement. Some observers suggest that MacKinnon's objections are
in fact threatening to sexuality itself. MacKinnon's critics are correct
here, for her argument bears on sexuality quite generally, even though
it is possible to generate a defense of antipornography legislation that
does not go so deep. In brief, MacKinnon suggests that we must
reformulate "the problem of sexuality from the repression of drives by
civilization to the oppression of women by men" (p. 98). In her view,
the sexual revolution of the i96O's and neo-Freudian arguments in
favor of removal of repression 8 2 are part of the problem rather than
its solution. Hence MacKinnon is reluctant to distinguish sharply
between erotica and pornography.83 Her central claim is that
"[s]exuality itself is a social construct gendered to the ground. Male
dominance here is not an artificial overlay upon an underlying inalterable substratum of uncorrupted essential sexual being" (p. 173). In
short, there is no prepolitical, unmediated "sexuality" that law, or
feminists, should attempt to uncover and translate into actual practice.
Sexuality, as practiced currently and generally, is itself enmeshed in,
a cause and a product of, sexual inequality. It is in this view that
pornography, sexual harassment, rape, and prostitution are not marginal issues but instead at the core of the problem. In her emphasis
on the centrality of sexuality, moreover, MacKinnon is in agreement
with Freud - although her conception of the purposes and effects of
sexuality is of course entirely different, because Freud treats sexuality
81 See Flogging Underwear: The New Raunchiness of Anierican Advertising, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1988, at 20.
82 Cf. I M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (R. Hurley trans. 1978) (discussing

different social attitudes toward sexuality). Astonishingly, Foucault fails to discuss problems of
sex discrimination and gender hierarchy.
83 MacKinnon writes:
What pornography says about us is that we enjoy degradation, that we are sexually
turned on by being degraded. For me that obliterates the line, as a line at all, between
pornography on one hand and erotica on the other, if what turns men on, what men
find beautiful, is what degrades women. It is pervasively present in art, also, and
advertising. But it is definitely present in eroticism, if that is what it is (p. 91).
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as essentially natural rather than socially constructed and does not
regard it as a source of unjustified subordination of women.
MacKinnon's claims about sexuality raise large and difficult issues
that cannot be properly evaluated in this space. The skepticism that
has greeted some of MacKinnon's work is surely in part a product of
the threat that this critique poses to practices that many think of as
deeply personal and private. It is here that MacKinnon's claims
sharply differ from other forms of social criticism, such as the New
Deal and the civil rights movement: despite the analytic parallel,
MacKinnon's argument enters an area that many men and women
perceive as far more threatening and even dangerous. Moreover, the
critique of sexuality is distinct from the dominance approach to sex
discrimination, although in MacKinnon's formulation the two are
merged. One might, for example, believe that issues of sex discrimination should be approached in terms of dominance rather than irrational differentiation without believing that sexuality itself is the
source of the problem.
How would one evaluate MacKinnon's approach to sexuality? An
enormous amount of theoretical and empirical work would be necessary to convince skeptics of her basic claim. The arguments that
sexuality is a social construct, that sexual sadism is the mainspring of
sexual inequality (p. 5), and that sexuality is built on male dominance
raise several questions. First, the connections among sexuality, nature, law, and culture are extraordinarily complex; indeed, it is not
altogether clear what the claim that "sexuality" is "a social construct"
means. Second, the relationship between sex discrimination and sexual sadism is hardly simple and clear cut. The term "sadism" is
perhaps misleading in this context, for it connotes a kind of pleasure
from pain that captures only a part of sexual inequality. Moreover,
sexual inequality is sometimes rooted in things other than sexual
sadism; economic, domestic, and other advantages are also important.
Women have been oppressed in nonsexual ways, and men receive
much more from gender inequality than sex on their own terms.
Third, the claim that sexuality is based on male dominance is in some
tension with the presence of affirmative descriptions of sexuality from
women, descriptions that are true to subjective experience. Indeed,
MacKinnon herself emphasizes that unremittingly bleak depictions of
sexuality are inconsistent with important elements of female as well
84
as male experience.
8 MacKinnon states:
In serious political analyses, say marxism, a worker can sometimes have a good day or
even a good job. That does not mean the worker has false consciousness or the work is
not exploited labor, structurally speaking ....
Because sexism is basic and has been
impervious to basic change, it makes sense that it would live in something socially
considered basic, deceptively a part of the given, enshrouded with celebratory myth and
ritual. Sex feeling good may mean that one is enjoying one's subordination; it would not
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Nevertheless, notions of sexual liberation and the removal of
repression often have as their underlying purpose and effect the increased sexual availability of women to men. Elements of sexual
sadism form an ingredient in sexual inequality; MacKinnon's position
here is both original and confirmed by unmistakable aspects of modern
culture. Moreover, the case for regulation of at least some pornographic materials is quite persuasive. Equally important, the antipornography movement has begun to affect both male and female
thinking about sexuality, rendering visible many practices and issues
formerly taken for granted. Sexualized violence toward women is
pervasive in advertising, popular culture, and everyday life. It is
difficult to see much of popular culture - and some high art as well
- in quite the same way after reading Feminism Unmodified.
MacKinnon's arguments furnish the tools with which to understand
all of this and eventually to do something about it. This is in itself
a considerable achievement.
IV. CONCLUSION

Feminism Unmodified is filled with novel, sometimes brilliant insights carrying broad implications for sex discrimination in particular
and legal theory in general. Insights of this sort have begun to reorient
legal understanding and social practices - especially in the area of
sexual harassment, where a minor revolution has already occurred.
Feminism Unmodified is reminiscent -

and deliberately so

-

of some

of the arguments associated with the New Deal attack on the common
law, the downfall of Lochner v. New York, and the civil rights movement.
At the same time, Feminism Unmodified will be hard for skeptics
to take; parts of it will appear polemical, one-sided, insufficiently
empirical, and at times conclusory. Controversy will continue about
the proper legal approach to pornography, comparable worth, abortion, and sexual violence - and even more about the relationship
between sexuality and sex discrimination. My suspicion, however, is
that a decade from now, the central insights of Feminism Unmodified,
and of MacKinnon's work generally, will be taken as substantially
correct in the legal culture. If they are not, the fault will lie with the
legal culture, not with the insights themselves.
be the first time. Or it may mean that one has glimpsed freedom, a rare and valuable
and contradictory event ....
The point is, the possible varieties of interpersonal engagement, including the pleasure of sensation or the experience of intimacy, does not,
things being as they are, make sex empowering for women (p. 218).

